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1. Introduction
The base period and the qualifying period are next to the unemployment benefit (UI bene-
fit) constituent parts of the unemployment insurance systems in most of the OECD (2002)
countries. A worker must complete the qualifying period within a statutory base period in or-
der to obtain a claim with a certain duration for UI benefits. Of the four parameters – base pe-
riod, qualifying period, UI benefit and benefit duration – we know through economic theory
(Mortensen Pissarides 1999, Pissarides 2000, Rogerson and Wright 2002) and empirical re-
search (Atkinson and Micklewright 1990, Layard, Nickell and Jackmann 1999, Nickell Hand-
book), that the amount and duration of the claim for UI benefit correlate positively with the
equilibrium rate of unemployment. There are two reasons for this. Both parameters raise the
workers’ reservation income and allow them to demand higher wages. As a result, the firms’
profits drop, the number of offered vacancies falls and the transition probability into employ-
ment decreases, while the length of the unemployment spells rises. Second, the jobs’ reserva-
tion productivity – the productivity threshold at which the continuation of the job is no longer
profitable – increases with the opportunity costs of the job. With the reservation productivity,
the unemployment incidence and the rate of job destruction increase. But a higher incidence
and a longer duration of unemployment are each sufficient to cause the equilibrium unem-
ployment rate to rise.
While the literature has focused on the effects of the amount and duration of the UI benefit,
there are, it appears, neither analytical nor empirical model analyses for the two other parame-
ters of the unemployment insurance system – the base period and qualifying period. The
qualifying period is often described as a rule having a financing and information function,
which reduces the moral hazard of the unemployed. It is, so the story goes, the low qualified
and low paid workers who are said to improve their situation by registering a claim for UI
benefit with the ill informed labour market authorities. According to this hypothesis, the
longer the qualifying period, the lower the likelihood that workers register as unemployed to
capture the UI benefits and the higher the accumulated contributions to finance the unem-
ployment insurance, when they themselves once claim UI benefit.
Our paper focuses on the macroeconomic effects of the qualifying period and the base pe-
riod. Employing a Mortensen-Pissarides type (MP) matching model (Mortensen and Pis-
sarides1994, Pissarides 2000), we show that a macroeconomic trade-off exists between the
qualifying period and base period on the one hand and the amount and duration of the UI
benefit on the other. If we take two otherwise identical countries with a similar unemploy-
ment rate, it is possible for one country to offer its job seekers a high level of UI benefit with2
a long benefit duration, while neutralising the effect on the equilibrium rate of unemployment
with a long qualifying period and/or a short base period.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a finite UI benefit duration as a pa-
rameter of the labour market policy into the MP-model. In Section 3, we integrate the base pe-
riod and the qualifying period into the MP-model. Section 4 deals with numerical simulations
with the instruments of passive labour market policy – benefit duration, qualifying period and
base period. Section 5 concludes.1
2. Benefit Duration T
The time structure of the model is discrete. Job creation takes place at the beginning and
job destruction at the end of a period. At the beginning of a period, a continuum of applicants
looks for suitable vacancies. When a match is found, firm and applicant negotiate the em-
ployment contract and begin production. At the end of the period, the output is sold, the wage
is paid and the agents decide on whether to continue the match. Idiosyncratic shocks, caused
either by technological change or fluctuations in demand, affect the productivity of the match
in the subsequent period. If the productivity is too low, the match is dissolved, the job be-
comes vacant and the worker unemployed. Job seekers who are eligible receive UI benefits,
which are paid as a flat rate at the end of a period.
Workers are homogenous. The labour force is represented as a unit mass, each worker is ei-
ther employed or not, hence u e+ = 1 ,w h e r ee denotes the pool of employed and u the pool of
unemployed. Out of the e employed, () e R G λ lose their job at the end of a period. ) (R G λ is
the endogenous separation rate, where λ is the probability of a job specific shock x. () x G ,
with the domain 1 0 ≤ ≤ ≤ x α , is the distribution function of x. α ≥ R is the endogenous res-
ervation productivity and yx, with the exogenous marginal product 0 > y , is the output of the
job. Worker and firm prefer the same separation rule, as is shown below. If R x ≥ , the match
is continued. If R x < , the job is destroyed. Since R is endogenous and x is bounded from be-
low, worker and firm can avoid job destruction by agreeing to the reservation productivity
0 ≥ =α R .T h eu job seekers search for a job and apply as soon as they find a vacancy. Job
seekers apply at most once per period and vacancies receive no more than one application.
Unemployment incidence. Job search takes place at the beginning of a period. Job seekers
who do not find a job form the inflow I of the pool of unemployed: () ( ) e R G p I λ − ≡ 1, w h e r e
p is the transition probability into employment, 1 0 < < p . We call () ( ) R G p λ − 1t h e ex-post-
1 Appendix IV with the proofs of the statements is available from the authors upon request.3
incidence. The unemployment incidence () R G λ comprises, in contrast to the ex-post-
incidence, the job seekers who find a vacancy immediately after losing their previous job, as
() ()( ) () R G p R G p R G λ λ λ − + = 1, w h e r e () R G pλ is the fraction of the job-to-job transitions.
Unemployment Insurance. Workers without a job register with the unemployment insur-
ance [] b T, . The unemployment insurance [] b T, has the following attributes.
(A1) [Employed Worker]. Each employed worker is entitled to claim UI benefits 0 > b if
made redundant. The benefit duration amounts to 0 ≥ T periods.
(A2) [Job Seekers]. j T u − is the pool of job seekers with a residual benefit duration of
0 ≥ − j T periods. j is the current spell of unemployment, T j , , 0 K = . An additional period of
unemployment first raises the current spell from j to 1 + j periods, second, reduces the
counter of the residual claims to () 0 1 ≥ + − j T and third, places the unemployed into pool
() 1 + − j T u . Job seekers who have not found employment T or more periods after losing their
previous job lose their right to UI benefits and form the job seeker pool 0 u .
Job seekers from the pool T u who lost their job at the end of the previous period are enti-
tled to UI benefit for T periods. In the steady state, the inflow I is identical to the pool T u ,s o
that () ( ) e R G p uT λ − = 1 . Those job seekers from T u , who still have no job at the succeeding
period, form the pool 1 − T u . For the pool of job seekers with a counter of residual claims equal
to j T − ,w eh a v e





− − = , 1 , , 0 − = T j K .
Since 1 < p , j T u − strictly decreases with an increasing spell length j.
Of the unemployed in the pool 0 u , 0 pu find a job. Thus in the steady state we have:
() ( ) e R G p pu T λ 1
0 1 + − = . From this steady condition, we can determine 0 u as
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Matching function. The labour market is a search market with two-sided search, character-
ised by frictions – heterogeneities, mobility costs and information asymmetries – not explic-
itly modelled. The function () v u m , represents the matching technology of the market, m is the
number of jobs filled with an input of u job seekers and v vacancies. The matching function is
linear homogenous, concave and monotone in both arguments. For a given vacancy,
() () ( ) v v u m m q , 1 , 1 = ≡ θ θ is the probability of an application, where the ratio of vacancies to
job seekers, u v = θ , is the tightness of the labour market. For a given job seeker,
() () θ θ θ q p = is the transition probability into employment. For convenience, we will write
() θ q q = and () θ p p = .
Plugging (1) and (2) into (3) gives, in view of the transition probability () θ p , the natural
rate of unemployment as a function of the tightness and the reservation productivity
(4) () () [] ()
() [] () () θ λ θ
λ θ
θ









The parameters of the unemployment insurance T and b do not affect u directly, but rather
through the ex-post-incidence, () [] ) ( 1 R G p λ θ − , and the duration of unemployment, () θ p 1.
Filled Jobs. Every match is formed by one vacancy and one job seeker. The match partners
negotiate the employment contract and begin production. An employment contract
() [ ] R x w w j T , , − has three components. j T w − is the outside wage, which the worker earns the
first period. The outside wage is dependent on the residual claims of the job seeker. If the ne-
gotiations fail, the worker receives UI benefit b up to another j T − periods, T j , , 0 K = .
The second component of the contract is the match specific inside wage with the wage
function []ℜ → 1 , : R w . At the end of a period, the succeeding periods’ productivity is re-
vealed to the match. If [] 1 , R x∈ , the match is continued and the worker earns the wage () x w .2
The third component of the contract shows the negotiated break-even productivity R,a tw h i c h
the job will be destroyed.
Continuation periods. Shocks hit a match with probability 0 ≥ λ . A job will be affected by
no more than one shock per period, where shocks are iid.
Let () x Π be the present value of a filled job after the manifestation of [] 1 , α ∈ x . Worker
and firm, considering their reservation utility, are both interested in continuing the match as
2 Mortensen/Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) present a discussion of objections against the plausibility
of this assumption and the two-tier wage structure which results from the possibility of renegotiation.5
long as () 0 ≥ x Π and agree on job destruction as soon as () 0 < x Π .S i n c e () x Π is a con-
tinuously increasing function of x, as will be shown below, a reservation threshold R exists,
for which
(5) () 0 = R Π .
Only jobs with R x ≥ will be continued.
We assume that the firm markets the output yx at the end of the period at the same time as it
pays the wage () x w . Then the steady state equation for the present-discounted value () x Π of
an occupied job is
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Flow and stock variables are discounted at the factor ρ ,w h e r e () 1 1 1 0 < + = < r ρ with the
real interest rate 0 > r . With probability λ the job is hit by a shock and changes into state h.I f
1 Rh ≤≤ the match is continued and the continuation value becomes () h Π . With probability
1 λ − the match specific productivity does not change.
A worker employed at the match specific productivity x earns the wage () x w , and his hu-
man capital has the present-discounted value () x W . The asset pricing equation for the worker is


















+ + = ∫ x W U R G h dG h W x w x W T
R
λ λ ρ 1
1
.
With probability λ a shock arrives and the match draws the productivity h.I fhR ≥ ,t h e
value of the worker is () h W and the match continues. If, on the other hand, hR < , which hap-
pens with probability () R G , the job is destroyed, the worker becomes unemployed and the
value of his human capital is T U .
Initial period. Firms choose the initial productivity 1 x = when they set up a match and ne-
gotiate the outside wage. If the firm meets a worker with the a current spell of unemployment
of length j, then the market value j T− Π of the newly filled job is
(8) () () { } j T j T w w − − − + = 1 1 ρ Π Π , T j , , 0 K = ,
where j T w − is the outside wage.6
The market value of a job seeker with a current spell of unemployment of length j is, in
view of the asset equation (7) and the outside wage j T w − :
(9) () () { } 1 1 w w W W j T j T − + = − − ρ , T j , , 0 K = .
Job creation. Entrance into the labour market is free for all vacancies, but open only at the
beginning of a period. The flow of vacancies therefore persists until the present value of a va-
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where k denotes the flow costs for advertising a vacancy, q is the probability of meeting a job
seeker, j T − µ the conditional probability that the applicant will have a current spell of unem-
ployment of length j and j T − Π the value of the newly filled job according to asset equation
(8).
All job seekers search for jobs with the same intensity. Therefore, u u j T j T − − = µ denotes
the probability with which a vacancy will meet a job seeker with a current spell of unem-
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Value of unemployment. Unemployed who are not eligible for UI benefit have the value
0 U , where in the steady state
(12) () ( ) 0 0 0 1 U z p pW U + − + = ρ .
With the probability p, the job seeker finds a job and his human capital takes on the initial
value 0 W (see equation (9)). If he is not matched, the unemployed worker gains utility from
leisure equal to z.
The human capital of a job seeker with a current spell of unemployment of length j has the
value j T U − . In the steady state, the first order linear inhomogeneous difference equation for
j T U − is7
(13) () () ] [ 1 1 + − − − + + − + = j T j T j T U b z p pW U ρ , 1 , , 0 − = T j K .
The human capital of the outsider who meets a vacancy has the value j T W − (see equation
(9)). Should the job seeker not meet a vacancy, he receives the UI benefit b in addition to the
utility of leisure z, the counter of the current spell of unemployment increases to () 1 + j and
his human capital takes on the value () 1 + − j T U .
Wage negotiations. Job search takes time and causes search costs. Therefore, each match
generates a positive monopoly rent which is distributed between the match partners through
the wage. The distribution rules are obtained according to the generalised Nash solution to a
bargaining problem, with () 1 , 0 ∈ β denoting the bargaining strength of the job seeker.
Taking into account the idiosyncratic productivity shock [] 1 , R x∈ , the reservation utility of
the insider T U , and the fact that in equilibrium the asset price of a vacancy is equal to zero,
the sharing rule used for the negotiations with an insider is







() T U x W − denotes the worker’s contribution and () x Π the firm’s contribution to the
quasi-rent of the job.
The job rent of a match with an outsider, who has a current spell of unemployment of
length j, will be distributed according to the following rule





, T j , , 0 K = ,
where the asset equations (8), (9), (12) and (13) give the initial values of the outsider, j T W − ,
the newly filled job, j T− Π , and the value of the unemployed at the time of wage negotiations,
j T U − .
LEMMA 1. [BARGAINED WAGES]. In view of the reservation income T rU of the insider and the
value j T U − of the job seekers with a current spell of unemployment of length j, the agents negotiate
the following inside and outside wages.
(i) The bargained inside wage at a match specific productivity [] 1 , R x∈ is
(16) () ( ) T T rU yx rU x w − + = β .
(ii) An outsider with a current spell of unemployment of length j, who produces in the first period
with the productivity 1 x = , earns the wage
(17) () ( ) () 1 1 1 −
− − − − − = ρ β j T T j T U U w w , T j , , 0 K = ,
where () 1 w is the inside wage (16) for 1 x = , and r + = − 1 1 ρ .8
As equation (16) shows, the inside wage equals the reservation income of the worker plus a
share of the current match rent that depends on his bargaining strength β .
Should an outsider with a current spell of unemployment of length j find a job, then the
guarantee value of his human capital increases by the amount of the differential rent
j T T U U − − . As the wage equation (17) illustrates, the firm which places the outsider under
contract takes the fraction β − 1 of this rent.
An outsider who lost his job in the previous period and found a follow-up job at the begin-
ning of the current period is entitled to T benefit payments in case the contract negotiations
fail. His reservation utility, therefore, does not differ from that of an insider and, for 0 = j ,
) 1 ( w w j T = − , as equation (17) shows.
Lemma 2. (i) [Filled Jobs]. The continuation value of a filled job producing with the idiosyncratic
productivity [] 1 , R x∈ is








β Π 1 .
(ii) [Job Destruction Rule]. The job destruction rule can be derived by evaluating the asset equa-
tion (6) at the reservation threshold R x = . Taking into account the wage equation (16) and the con-
tinuation value (18) we obtain:











As the destruction rule (19) illustrates, the current reservation output of a match is lower
than its permanent reservation income. Since the firm can destroy the job at no charge (free
disposal) and the supply of vacancies is infinitely elastic, the reservation income of the match
is identical with the reservation income of the worker. Therefore, when the job produces the
reservation output yR, then the match partners suffer a current loss equal to () () ∫
1
R h dG h Π λ
and the worker, with the wage () T rU R w < , forgoes part of the income, which he would have
earned as a registered unemployed and the utility of leisure. The reason why the match part-
ners are willing to accept losses is the option value of the filled job. If they dissolve the job
search and recruiting costs arise to find a new match. In order to avoid these transaction costs,
the agents prefer to wait for a recovery of the demand and carry losses up to the limit of the
reservation output.
In order to close the model, we still have to determine the reservation income of the differ-
ent types of unemployed. The unemployment insurance [] b T, creates a discrete distribution
with 1 + T types on the pool of job seekers. The job seeker types differ with respect to their
residual entitlement to UI benefits and in turn in their reservation utility and the outside wages
they are able to demand when matched to a vacancy. Given the distribution of the market val-9
ues of the 1 + T job seeker types, we finally can derive the distribution of the initial values of
the filled jobs.
Lemma 3 (i) [Reservation Income]. From the asset equations for the job seekers, the dis-
tribution rules and the equations for the initial values, we obtain the distribution of the reser-
vation income of the 1 + T job seeker types with
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(ii) [Initial Values]. The distribution of the initial values of jobs is obtained from
(21) () ( ) ( ) j T T j T U U − − − − + = β Π Π 1 1 , T j , , 0 K = .
As (20) and (21) show, while, cet. par., the reservation income of a job seeker with a cur-
rent spell of unemployment of length j decreases, the value of a job filled by an outsider with
the same current spell, increases monotonically with j. As a result, unemployed without bene-
fit entitlement from pool 0 u have the lowest market value of all the job seekers and the jobs
filled by the type 0 u -unemployed have the highest market value of all newly formed jobs.
The equilibrium of the search model consists of solutions () [ ] u R U j T , , , , 1 θ Π − , T j , , 0 K = ,
to the equations (10), (18) – (20) and the equilibrium unemployment (4).
Labour Market Policy. An increase in the benefit duration T raises the fraction of job seek-
ers with a long residual duration of benefit entitlement. Their reservation income increases
and, consequently, the outside wages they demand increase too. The initial values of the
newly established firms fall and the supply of vacancies declines. In turn, the tightness of the
labour market decreases and the duration of unemployment, () θ p 1 , rises. In addition, the ex-
post-incidence () [] () R G p λ θ − 1 increases. The rising duration of unemployment and the higher
ex-post-incidence are each sufficient to raise the equilibrium rate of unemployment, see Ap-
pendices III and IV.
3. Qualifying Period, Base Period and Waiting time
In the unemployment insurance [] b T F E , , , with qualifying period 2 ≥ E and base period
E F ≥ , workers who lose their job before completing the qualifying period have no claim to
UI benefit. In order to model the insurance, we introduce the following five assumptions (A1)
– (A5), where (A1) – (A4) deal with the qualifying period and (A5) describes the role of the
base period.10
3.1 Qualifying Period E
(A1) [Completed Qualifying Period]. The qualifying period of a worker who was em-
ployed for at least E periods in the base period F is completed. If a worker with a completed
qualifying period becomes unemployed, he is entitled to up to T payments of the UI benefit b.
The benefit duration T can be shorter, as long as or longer than the qualifying period E.O u t
of 20 member states of the OECD (2002), ten – e.g. Canada, Switzerland, Great Britain and
the Scandinavian countries – have a benefit duration T which is longer than E –i nB e l g i u m ,
the benefit duration T is actually unlimited. In a further seven countries – e.g. Germany, Aus-
tria, Japan and Spain –, the benefit duration is shorter than the qualifying period; in three
countries – France, Portugal and the USA –, the insurance system provides a qualifying pe-
riod which is just as long as T.
(A2) [Transferability]. Residual claims to UI benefit from earlier employment spells are
lost; qualifying periods on the other hand are intertemporally transferable. There is neither a
market for claims to UI benefits nor for qualifying periods.
(A3) [Employed worker]. Each employed worker is characterised by a tupel [] D i E , − ,i n
which the counter 0 ≥ − i E shows the number of currently accumulated qualifying points of
the worker and D the duration of his current claim to the UI benefit b. i denotes the number of
uncompleted qualifying (sub-)periods, with 1 , , 0 − = E i K . The benefit duration {} T D , 0 ∈ is a
binary variable and either equal to T or zero – depending on whether the qualifying period is
completed or not. An additional period of employment – during an uncompleted qualifying
period – raises the counter of the qualifying points from i E − to () E i E ≤ − − 1 .
(A4) [Job Seekers]. Each job seeker is characterised by a tupel [] j T i E − − , : the counter
0 ≥ − i E shows the number of currently accumulated qualifying points and 0 ≥ − j T the re-
sidual benefit duration, where T j , , 0 K = . An additional period of unemployment of a job
seeker who still owns residual benefit claims raises the length of the current spell of unem-
ployment from j to 1 + j and reduces the counter for the residual benefit duration from j T − to
() 0 1 ≥ + − j T .
3.2 Base Period
Many countries of the OECD have established base periods in order to make qualifying pe-
riods easier to obtain. The original base period of the first German unemployment insurance
in 1927, for example, amounted to 12 months for a qualifying period of 6 months. After
countless alterations, the base period was extended to two years in 1956. In 1969, there was a11
further extension of the base period to 3 years, while the qualifying period was still 6 months.
Finally, in 1982, in view of the rising mass unemployment, the qualifying period was ex-
tended to 12 months.
One consequence of integrating a base period rule into the unemployment insurance is that
the tupel [] j T i E − − , does not unambiguously characterise a job seeker. A worker who lost
his job in the previous period and had no match in the current period, signs on and is, accord-
ing to assumption (A1), eligible to UI benefits if he was employed for at least E periods dur-
ing the current base period of length F. The employment records with a completed qualifying
period differ, however, in regard to how the 0 ≥ − E F periods, in which the worker was either
employed or seeking a job, were distributed over the base period F. There are two different
cases here.
If E F = , there is exactly one employment record which meets the qualification: only those
workers who were continuously employed for at least E periods are eligible to UI benefits. If,
on the other hand, E F > , then the number of employment records with a current counter of,
for example, 0 ≥ − i E qualifying points is possibly very large, as is indicated by the following
example. Let A and B be job seekers with identical qualifying counters 0 ≥ − i E .B o t hh a v e
recently found a job. Whereas A, however, was employed F periods ago, B was unemployed.
Since the oldest period in the previous base period is continuously replaced by the most recent
period by moving forward through the calendar, B receives the counter status () 1 − − i E at the
end of the current period, whereas A still only has i E − qualifying points. Why? Both work-
ers have an additional employment period at the end of the current period. B, however, be-
cause of his employment record, replaces a period of unemployment at the beginning of the
previous base period with the current employment period in the present base period, so that
his counter increases by one; A, on the other hand, replaces an employment period at the be-
ginning of the previous base period with a current employment period in the present base pe-
riod, so that his counter is constant. The tupel [] j T i E − − , , therefore, does not unambiguously
characterise job seekers A and B in the insurance system [] b T F E , , , if E F > .
The length of the waiting time of a job seeker of type [] j T i E − − , , which passes until the
next benefit entitlement begins, depends on the distribution of the i E − employment periods
over the base period F. The longer F is, the greater, cet. par., the number of different em-12
ployment records with i E − qualifying points and the greater the range of the distribution of
waiting times of otherwise identical job seekers.3
The reservation utility of an applicant and his initial wage depend on three factors in the in-
surance system [] b T F E , , , . First, the counter of the residual benefit duration j T − ; second, the
accumulated qualifying points i E − ; and thirdly, the distribution of the i E − employment pe-
riods over the base period F. The higher the number of accumulated qualifying points, the
longer the residual benefit duration or the sooner the job seeker will complete the qualifying
period, the higher his wage demand will be during the contract negotiations.
An investor offering a vacancy knows just as little ex ante about the applicants’ specific
employment record as their accumulated qualifying points or their residual benefit claims. Yet
the value of the job and, consequently, his decision to offer a vacancy depends on these vari-
ables. In order to provide a simple model of the investor’s decision, we assume that the initial
value of a filled job, j iT E − − Π , will only be directly influenced by the characteristics
[] j T i E − − , of the job seeker and not by the distribution of the i E − employment periods over
t h eb a s ep e r i o dF. The risk-neutral investor, therefore, need “only” estimate the probability
j iT E − − µ of meeting a type [] j T i E − − , applicant who has i E − qualifying points and a resid-
ual benefit duration of T–jperiods.
We model the effect of the applicant’s employment record on the decision of the investors
– i.e. the distribution of the i E − employment periods over the base period F and their effect
on the initial value of a filled job – using a Markov process. Let j iT E u − − denote the pool of
job seekers with i E − qualifying points and j T − residual benefit periods.
(A5) [Employment Record]. The unemployed from the pool j iT E u − − , who have had no
match, make a transition into the pool () 1 + − − j iT E u with the probability [ ) 1 , 0 ∈ γ a n di n t ot h e
pool ()( ) 1 1 + − + − j T i E u with the probability ( ] 1 , 0 1 ∈ − γ .4






F employment records with i E − qualifying points in the base period F, E i , , 0 K = .
If, for example, – as in Germany (SGB III) – the base period comprises 36 = F months and the qualifying pe-






F possible employment records with a completed qualify-
ing period.
4 In the first case – as with B in the introductory example –, the job seeker was unemployed F periods ago; in
the second – as with A –, he had a job F periods ago. In the first case, the job seeker replaces a period of un-
employment at the beginning of the previous base period with a period of unemployment at the end of the
present base period, which is why his counter i E − is constant; in the second case, the job seeker swaps an
employment period at the beginning of the previous base period for a period of unemployment at the end of
the current base period and the counter of his qualifying counter decreases from i E − to () 1 + − i E .13
If a type [] j T i E − − , job seeker is unemployed for an additional period, the residual benefit
duration decreases from j T − to () 1 + − j T in accordance with (A4). Although only in the
second case, described in (A5), does the counter of the qualifying period also fall from i E −
to () 1 + − i E , while in the first case the counter is constant.5
At the micro level, there exists no correlate of the transition probability γ . Although at the
macro level, the policy parameter γ has similar effects as the distribution of the employment
periods i E − over the base period F.F i r s t ,i f E F = , this case corresponds to a transition
probability of 0 = γ , as there is only one employment record with a continuous employment
spell of E periods which meets qualification. Second, the longer cet. par. the base period F,
the higher the fraction of agents in the inflow to the aggregate pool of unemployed u who can
claim UI benefit. An increase in the transition probability γ has the same effect on the mix of
types in the inflow to u as an extension of the base period F. At the macro level, γ establishes
the fraction of the job seekers from the pool ∑ = − − − ≡ T
j j iT E i E u u 1 , E i , , 0 K = , whose qualify-
ing counters do not change despite advancing calendar time and who therefore search for a
job in the following period with i E − qualifying points again. For the fraction γ − 1 of the
unemployed from pool i E u − on the other hand, both the counter of the residual claims and the
qualifying counter sink by one and their reservation income decreases correspondingly. Third
– just as in the case ∞ → F -, if 1 → γ , the fraction of the employed worker with a completed
qualifying period approaches one irrespective of the length of the qualifying period E.
3.3 Qualifying Path and Unemployment Rate in the Steady State
The unemployment insurance [] b T E , , ,γ with the qualifying period E, base period γ and
benefit duration T creates a discrete distribution of E types among the pool of employed
worker. Employed workers differ in the qualifying counter i E − , 1 , , 0 − = E i K . In the follow-
ing, i E e − is the pool of workers with i E − qualifying points. Among the u unemployed, the
unemployment insurance likewise creates a discrete distribution of types6, who differ with re-
spect to the qualifying points i E − , 1 , , 0 − = E i K , and the residual benefit duration j T − ,
5 Consequently, from (A4) and (A5), it follows that the counter of the length j of the current spell of unem-
ployment is at least as large as the counter i of the missing qualifying points, such that for all job seekers
i j ≥ .
6 If T E ≤ ,t h e r ea r e () ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 1 1 E
1
1 + − + + = + − ∑
+
= E E T k E T
E
k types of job seeker; if 1 + ≥ T E , the number
of job seeker types amounts to () ( ) ( ) () 1 2 1 1 0 + + + = − + − + ∑ = E T T T E k T
T
k . The steady state equations for
the employees i E e − and job seekers j iT E u − − are developed further in Appendix I.14
T i j , ,K = . With j iT E u − − , we denote the pool of job seekers with i E − qualifying points and
a residual benefit duration of j T − periods.
Since the time of the model is discrete, every employed worker owns at least one qualifying
point. Job seekers from the pool ∑ = − = T
E j j T u u 0 0 , who, because of their long unemployment,
do not possess any accumulated qualifying points, begin their employment record in the pool
1 e and make a transition to the pool 2 e if 2 R x ≥ at the end of the first period of the current
employment spell.7 2 R is the negotiated reservation productivity for the transition from the
pool 1 e to pool 2 e , see Fig.1. Consider a filled job with i E − , 1 , , 1 − = E i K , qualifying points.
Firm and worker have to decide at the end of the period whether to continue the job. In case
of a continuation, the worker makes a transition to the pool () 1 − − i E e . The match partners de-
cide in regard to the bargained reservation productivity () 1 − − i E R .G i v e n [] 1 , α ∈ x , they proceed
with the job, if and only if () 1 − − ≥ i E R x , otherwise the match dissolves, the job becomes va-
cant and the worker unemployed – without claim to the UI benefit. Jobs from the pool 1 − E e
which are close to the completion of the qualifying period decide to continue and make a tran-
sition to pool E e ,i f E R x ≥ . The pool E e comprises all, and only, those jobs with a completed
qualifying period. A job from E e is continued if 1 + ≥ E R x . Otherwise it is destroyed, and the
worker becomes unemployed – with claim to unemployment benefit. 1 + E R is the bargained
reservation productivity of the jobs with a completed qualifying period.
We call the path of the reservation productivities [] E E R R , , 2 K = Ψ , 2 ≥ E ,t h equalifying
path: every worker must – possibly interrupted by unemployment spells – pass through the
qualifying path E Ψ before his qualifying period is completed and he is entitled to UI benefit.
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FIG. 1: Qualifying path
Out of the i E e − employed workers with the qualifying counter i E − , () ( ) i E i E e R G − − − 1 λ
lose their job at the end of the period. In the ensuing matching at the beginning of the follow-
ing period, () []() ( ) i E i E e R G p − − − − 1 1 λ θ do not meet a vacancy and form the inflow to the pool
7 Whether the creation of vacancies is profitable depends in particular on the reservation productivity 1 R .F o r
profitability 1 1 ≤ R is a necessary condition because the firms choose the initial productivity at 1 = x .15
of unemployed u; () []() ( ) 1 1 − − − i E R G p λ θ is the ex-post-incidence among the workers with the
qualifying counter i E − . In the steady state, entries to the unemployment pool u are equal to
the exits, so that () [] () () () u p e R G p
E i
i i E i E θ λ θ = − ∑
− =
= − − −
1
0 1 1 . If we divide both sides of the
steady state condition by e and take into account that u e − =1 , we obtain the steady state un-
employment rate
(22) ()
() [] () ()
() [] () () () θ ε λ θ
ε λ θ
Ψ θ
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where () 1 , , + − − = E E i E i E R Ψ θ ε ε , with e e i E i E − − = ε , 1 , , 0 − = E i K , is the fraction of the em-





i i E ε . As Lemma A4 in the
Appendix IV shows, the shares i E− ε and the unemployment rate (22) are functions of the
tightness of the labour market θ , the qualifying path [] E E R R , , 2 K = Ψ and the reservation
productivity 1 + E R of the jobs with a completed qualifying period.
The equilibrium unemployment rate (22) – similarly to the steady state rate (4) of the un-
employment insurance [] b T, – depends on, first, the weighted average of the ex-post-
incidences, () [] () () ∑
−




i i E i E R G p ε λ θ , and second, the duration of job search, () θ p 1 .
3.4 Qualifying Rents and Waiting time
First, we deal with the arbitrage equations of the filled jobs and the employed workers in
the continuation periods of a match, then we focus on the job creation condition, the wage ne-
gotiations, the qualifying rents and finally the waiting time.
Continuation periods. The value of a filled job with a completed qualifying period is de-
rived from the asset equation (6) and the value of the worker from equation (7). For conven-
ience, we repeat the equations. A filled job with a completed qualifying period has the value
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and the value of the worker is:
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where [] ℜ → + + 1 , : 1 1 E E R w is the function of the inside wage and ET U is the value of a job
seeker whose qualifying period and benefit entitlement are complete. Firm and worker with a
completed qualifying period share the match rent according to the rule (14).
The continuation value of a job with i E − qualifying points, 1 , , 0 − = E i K , and the produc-
tivity [] 1 , i E R x − ∈ is given by
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, 0 max 1
i E R
i E i E i E i E x h dG h x w yx x Π λ Π λ ρ Π .
Firm and worker negotiate the reservation productivity () 1 − − i E R , on which the transition to
the pool () 1 − − i E e depends. If the match is hit by a shock and draws the productivity
() 1 − − ≥ i E R h , the match is continued, otherwise it is destroyed. If no shock arrives, firm and
worker must still decide whether to proceed. The reason is that if the match continues, the
worker makes a transition to the pool () 1 − − i E e . Since the firm is free to destroy the job at no
charge (free disposal), it decides for the alternative () () { } x i E 1 , 0 max − − Π . The worker also pre-
fers continuation only, if () () 0 1 ≥ − − x i E Π , as is shown below.
The value of a worker with the qualifying counter i E − , 1 , , 0 − = E i K is given by
(26) ()
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If the job is hit by a shock and draws () 1 − − < i E R h , it is destroyed and the worker with the
qualifying counter i E − becomes unemployed. In the case 0 = i , the worker has the value
ET U and is entitled to UI benefits; in the case 1 , , 1 − = E i K , the worker’s qualifying period is
not yet completed and his value is 0 i E U − .
If a shock arrives, the worker chooses the alternative () () { } x W U i E i E 1 0, max − − − .I f
() () 0 1 i E i E U x W − − − ≥ –o r () ET E U x W ≥ +1 , in the case 0 = i – he decides to continue the match,
otherwise he leaves the firm and makes a transition to unemployment (free disposal). As the
insiders distribute their monopoly rent according to the rule17





0 1 , 1 , , 0 − = E i K ,
() () 0 1 i E i E U x W − − − ≥ applies if and only if () () 0 1 ≥ − − x i E Π . The distribution rule (27) takes
into account that the worker makes a transition to i E e − if the wage negotiations succeed, but
if the bargaining fails, the worker passes into the job seeker status with a qualifying counter
equal to () 1 + − i E and no entitlement to benefits. His value in this case is () 0 1 + − i E U .
The initial value j iT E − − Π of a newly filled job, the value of an outsider, who accepts a
job, j iT E W − − , moreover, the distribution rule, which job seekers and vacancies employ in
their contract negotiations as well as the asset equations for the value of the unemployed
j iT E U − − are developed in Appendix IV.8
Job creation.O u to ft h eu job seekers, there are j iT E u − − , who have i E − qualifying points
and a current spell of unemployment of length j. Since all job seekers search for jobs with the
same intensity, for a given vacancy u u j iT E j iT E − − − − = µ is the conditional probability of an
application from a job seeker from j iT E u − − . The probabilities j iT E − − µ – developed in
Lemma A5, Appendix IV – are functions of the tightness θ , the base period γ , the qualifying
path E Ψ and the reservation productivity 1 + E R for jobs with a completed qualification. The
expected market value of a newly filled job is therefore ∑ − − − − j iT E j iT E Π µ . Access to the
labour market is free, so that in the steady state, given the search costs k and the probability q
of an application, the following job creation condition applies:
(28) ∑∑ + − =
==





j iT E j iT E q k
0
0 Π µ .
The agents negotiate the following outside and inside wages.
Lemma 4 [Bargained Wages]. (i) The bargained inside wage of a worker with a completed
qualifying period at a match specific productivity [] 1 , α ∈ x is
(29) () ( ) ET ET E rU yx rU x w − + = + β 1 .
The inside wage of a worker with the counter i E − and the job specific productivity [] 1 , α ∈ x is:
(30)
[] () []




− = − − − − +
= − − − − +
=
+ − − + − + −
− − −
−
1 , , 1 , 1
0 , 1
) (
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
10 10 10
E i U U rU yx rU
i U U rU yx rU
x w
i E i E i E i E




(ii) Since newly filled jobs produce with the productivity 1 x = , a job seeker with the counter i E −
and a residual benefit duration of j T − periods, T i j , ,K = , obtains the outside wage
8 The initial value of the filled jobs and the workers can be found in the equations (A32) and (A33), and the
values of the unemployed human capital are represented in the equation (A34).18
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where () 1 1 + E w and () () 1 1 − − i E w are the inside-wages (29) and (30) for 1 x = .
T h ei n s i d ew a g e ) (x w i E− of a worker with the counter i E − has – as (30) shows – three
components: the guarantee income, () 0 1 + − i E rU , the worker’s share of the current match rent,
() [ ] 0 1 + − − i E rU yx β , and the wage penalty () () [ ] 0 1 0 1 + − − − − i E i E U U β . The wage penalty has
the following reason. At the end of the previous period, the worker had () 1 + − i E qualifying
points and the guarantee value () 0 1 + − i E U . If the match is continued, the counter increases by
one to i E − and the guarantee value of the human capital increases by the qualifying rent
() 0 1 0 + − − − i E i E U U . Out of the qualifying rent, the firm which employs the worker appropriates
the share β − 1 .
In accordance with (A2), the qualifying period is an asset owned by the worker, which is
not tradable. Thus, since the labour force is exogenous, a dissipation of the qualifying rent,
even in the steady state, is generally not to be expected. The supply of vacancies and the res-
ervation productivities are the only quantity variables of the model with which the market sys-
tem reacts to the qualifying rents created by the unemployment insurance.
If one compares, cet. par., two agents with a completed qualifying period ( 0 = i ) – one is an
outsider, the other an insider – then, as we would expect, the outsider is worse off, because, as
opposed to the insider, he has to accept a wage penalty, as seen in the first line of (31). The
wage penalty is determined by the length j of the current spell of unemployment and the
quasi-rent j ET ET U U − − , by which the guarantee value of the outsider is lower than guarantee
value of the insider.
If one now compares two agents with the counter i E − who have as yet not completed
their qualifying period – one is an outsider and has a residual entitlement to UI benefits of
j T − periods, the other is an insider – then the outsider is better off, since he receives a wage
bonus, which is depend on the quasi-rent 0 i E j iT E U U − − − − , as the second line of (31) shows.
The insider is worse off because his qualifying period is not yet completed and as a result, in
accordance with (A1), he has no benefit entitlement – as opposed to the outsider.
As the following proposition shows, the market value of a filled job () () x i E 1 − − Π ,
E i , , 0 K = , is a continuously increasing function of [] 1 , α ∈ x .I f () () 0 1 ≤ − − α Π i E ,a sw ea s -
sume throughout, a reservation productivity () 1 − − i E R exists, which fulfils the reservation con-
dition19
(32) () () ( ) 0 1 1 = − − − − i E i E R Π , E i , , 0 K = .
The asset values of the filled jobs and the job destruction rules are discussed in the follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition. (i) [Filled Jobs]. The value of a filled job with a completed qualifying period and the
idiosyncratic productivity [] 1 , 1 + ∈ E R x ,i s










Obviously, () x E 1 + Π is a continuously increasing function of x. Through backward induction, the
continuity and monotonicity are transferred to () x i E− Π , as the equation (34) shows. The value of a
job from the pool i E e − , 1 , , 0 − = E i K ,i s
(34) () ( )( ) ( ) () () {} () () {} [] {} . , 0 max , 0 max 1 1 1 1 i E i E i E i E i E R x R x y x − − − − − − − − − + − − = Π Π λ β ρ Π
(ii) [Job Destruction]. For a job with a completed qualifying period, the job destruction rule can
be derived by evaluating the asset equation (23) at the reservation threshold 1 + = E R x .T a k i n gi n t o
account the wage equation (29) we obtain:


















For a job with the qualifying counter i E − , the job destruction rule can be derived from the asset
equation (25), the reservation condition (32) and the wage equation (30) with
(36)
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As the equations (35) and (36) show, the current break-even output of a match is lower than
the match’s permanent reservation income both during the waiting time of the worker, see
equation (36), and also after the completion of the qualifying period, see equation (35). The
reservation income of a match – given the assumption of free disposal and the infinitely elas-
tic supply of vacancies – is identical with the reservation income of the worker.
With the job destruction rule (35), the firm andt h ew o r k e rw h oi se n t i t l e dt oU Ib e n e f i t s
choose the reservation productivity 1 + E R such that for the break-even output of the match:
ET E rU yR < +1 . The firms are willing to hoard workers and to supply the market even if hit by
negative productivity or demand shocks. The reasons for this behaviour are the positive
search costs and the resulting option value of a filled job. The option value is the expected20
market value of a productive job weighted with the shock probability λ . If demand or the pro-
ductivity changes in favour of the job, the hoarded workers are immediately ready to start
production, since on the internal labour market neither search nor recruiting costs arise. If the
match partners would separate as soon as the output falls below the guarantee income of the
worker, they would sacrifice this option and have to search for another match.
The waiting time is the time which passes until a worker on the qualifying path becomes
eligible to UI benefits. Under the conditions of the unemployment insurance [] b T E , , ,γ the
waiting time is endogenous, whereby workers face the following trade-off.
The shock parameter [] 1 , α ∈ x is bounded from below. Consequently, a match can force the
continuation of production until the UI entitlement is reached. Thus, for example, a worker
with the qualifying counter i E − can reduce his waiting time to exactly i periods, if he and the
firm fix the reservation productivity along the residual qualifying path at the level of the
lower support α , such that 0 ≥ = − α m E R , 1 , , 0 − = i m K . By taking this extreme decision,
however, the worker must accept a low wage, a boundary solution, which pays only if he can
expect a high UI benefit b, a long benefit duration T or a low utility of leisure z.
The worker will weigh up the disadvantages of restraining his wage claims against the
benefit from a reduction in the waiting time. His willingness to restrain his wage claims dur-
ing the waiting time – as the job destruction rule (36) shows – is bounded by the path of the
reservation incomes, the qualifying rents he can expect to capture and the option value of the
filled job.
The option value of the filled job is measured by the integral expression in equation (36).
Since the worker makes a transition independent of the prevailing market conditions from
i E e − to () 1 − − i E e when the job is continued, the lower bound of the integral is the reservation
productivity () 1 − − i E R which is the threshold productivity for the transition to () 1 − − i E e .
If the firm currently produces at the break-even point with the reservation productivity
i E R − and is not hit by a shock – an event which has the probability λ − 1 , – the firm opts for
the alternative () () { } i E i E R − − − 1 , 0 max Π , since it can destroy the job without charge at any time
(free disposal).
Finally, the worker’s willingness to accept a sequence of low wage incomes on the qualify-
ing path is bounded by the qualifying rents. If the firm and worker negotiate the reservation
productivity i E R − , the worker’s guarantee value is () 0 1 + − i E U . If the match is continued, his
guarantee value increases to 0 i E U − . In order to capture the qualifying rent () 0 1 0 + − − − i E i E U U21
created by the insurance system, the worker is prepared to decrease the reservation output of
the match by an amount just equal to the qualifying rent.
Solution. To solve the model, we must determine the equilibrium path of the reservation
productivities () 1 − − i E R , E i , , 0 K = , and the tightness θ of the labour market – in total 2 + E
endogenous variables. The reservation productivities, as the job destruction rules (35) – (36)
show, depend on the reservation incomes of the workers, the qualifying rents and the market
values of the filled jobs. The market values of the filled jobs are in turn functions of the reser-
vation productivities, as equations (33) – (34) show. In order to close the model, Lemma A7
in the Appendix IV shows how both the reservation incomes of the workers and the qualify-
ing rents depend on the market values of the filled jobs and, thus, the reservation productiv-
ities. To calculate the tightness θ , we need the job creation condition (28). The conditional
probabilities j iT E − − µ of meeting a job seeker with the qualifying counter i E − and a resid-
ual benefit duration of j T − periods are developed in Lemma A5 in the Appendix IV.
4. Simulation
Parameters and matching function. The base parameters for the numeric simulations, are
shown in Table A1, Appendix I. The bargaining power of the workers is 50 . 0 = β ,t h em a r -
ginal product of a job at full productivity is 100 y = . The value of leisure is 40 = z , UI benefits
are 40 = b . The real interest rate r is 2 %; the probability of a productivity shock λ is 10 %;
the search and recruiting costs of a vacancy amount to 40 = k .
The distribution function () x G of the productivity shocks is assumed to be uniform on [] 1 , α ,
with the lower support 0 = α . Hence, () ( ) tx G x tG = holds for all [] 1 , 0 ∈ t .
The matching function of the search market is of the Cobb Douglas type (Petrongolo/ Pis-
sarides 2001). For a given vacancy the probability of a contact with a job seeker is
() () φ θ θ − − = 1 q . For the elasticity of the job matches with respect to vacancies, we use
50 . 0 = = β φ (Hosios 1990).
Indicators. The following indicators are used to evaluate the simulations: (1) sequence of
reservation productivities () 1 − − i E R , E i , , 0 K = ; (2) unemployment rate u in percent; (3) unem-
ployment incidence In-exP, with In-exP () [] () () ∑
− =




i i E i E R G p ε λ θ . In-exP,t h e
weighted ex-post-incidence, is the fraction of the employed worker who lose their job, do not
find a follow-up job at the subsequent matching and, as a result, are unemployed for at least
one period. Define () i E
E
i i E E R R −
−
= − − ∑ ≡ ε
1
0 1 . E R is the mean of the reservation productivities22
of the qualifying path [] E E R R , , 2 K = Ψ and the jobs with a completed qualifying period
1 + E R .F o rt h eex-post-incidence, by virtue of the homogeneity of the uniform distribution G
on the support [] 1 , 0 , the following holds: In-exP () [] () E R G p λ θ − = 1 . (4) unemployment dura-
tion D-exP in periods, with D-exP () θ p 1 = .
The results of the simulations with the qualifying period E, the benefit duration T and the
base period γ are shown in the Appendices III-IV.
Appendix II provides simulations with the benefit duration T and the qualifying period E
for a given base period 10 . 0 = γ . For the qualifying period, we assume 8 , 4 = E and for the
benefit duration, 20 , , 2 , 1 K = T . In addition, Appendix II compares the two unemployment in-
surance systems [] b T E , , ,γ and [] b T, (see Section 2). With the unemployment insurance [] b T, ,
every worker is entitled to up to T payments of the UI benefit b. The model of the unemploy-
ment insurance [] b T, , therefore, implicitly assumes that for the qualifying period 1 = E and the
base period 1 = γ .
Appendix III deals with comparative static simulations with the base period γ for a benefit
duration of 10 = T periods and the qualifying periods 8 , 4 = E .
Result 1. 1. As figures (a) and (b) in Appendix II demonstrate, the qualifying path E Ψ fol-
lows the same pattern in all simulations: first, the reservation productivities strictly decrease
until they reach their minimum in the last period before the completion of the qualifying pe-
riod. As soon as firm and worker have captured the qualifying rents, the reservation produc-
tivity, the quit rate and the wage income of the employed worker jump to the levels of the
jobs with a completed qualifying period.
Figure (a) shows the qualifying path E Ψ for 4 = E and 8 = E and a benefit duration of
10 = T periods. The counter of the qualifying period, 1 , , 1 + = E i K , is depicted on the hori-
zontal axis and the corresponding reservation productivities are graphed on the vertical axis.
Figure (b) pictures, for the case 4 = E , the four reservation productivities of the qualifying
path 4 Ψ and the reservation productivity 1 + E R of the jobs with a completed qualifying period,
against the benefit duration T on the horizontal axis. If we draw a vertical line through figure
(b) at 10 = T , we obtain the qualifying path 4 Ψ for 4 = E , which is shown in diagram (a).
2. For a given qualifying period E, the unemployment rate u strictly increases with the
benefit duration T. T affects u via two channels: first, through the weighted ex-post-incidence,
In-exP () [] () () ∑
− =




i i E i E R G p ε λ θ , and second, through the expected unemployment
duration, () θ p 1 . Consider, for example, the insurance system with the qualifying period23
4 = E , Appendix II. If the policymakers increase the benefit duration from 1 = T to 20 = T ,
the expected duration of unemployment increases from 1.59 to 2.08 periods, Fig. (c), the ex-
post-incidence increases from 3.50 % to 4.89 %, Fig. (d), and the unemployment rate, as a re-
sult, rises from 5.26 % to 9.23 %, see Fig. (e).
Result 2. The comparison with the insurance system [] b T, shows that the rule of the quali-
fying period lowers the aggregate unemployment. Under the unemployment insurance [] b T, ,
33 . 5 = u %i f 1 = T ,a n d 18 . 10 = u %i f 20 = T . The plots in Appendix II show the reasons for
the strictly increasing difference between the rates of unemployment of the two insurance sys-
tems, see Fig. (e). Under the conditions of the insurance system [] b T E , , ,γ , not only is the av-
erage duration of unemployment shorter than in the system [] b T, , as Fig. (c) shows, but the
ex-post-incidence is also lower, see Fig. (d).
Result 3. 1. An extension of the qualifying period E for a given base period ( 10 . 0 = γ )l o w -
ers the unemployment rate, as Fig. (e) and (f) show. If the policymakers increase the qualify-
ing period to 8 = E , for example, the unemployment rate for a benefit duration of 1 = T is
equal to 25 . 5 = u % ,a n du pt oab e n e f i tp e r i o do f 20 = T periods, rises to 85 . 8 = u %, Fig. (e).
Figure (f) graphs the unemployment rate u against the qualifying period E for a given benefit
duration of 10 = T periods. For 1 = E , 62 . 9 = u %, while 60 . 8 = u %, if 8 = E .
The unemployment rate strictly decreases with an increasing E, since, cet. par., both the
unemployment duration and the weighted ex-post-incidence decrease with the rising E,s e e
Fig. (c) and Fig. (d). For 10 = T , the unemployment duration falls from 2.11 periods if 1 = E
to 2.03 periods if 4 = E d o w nt o2 . 0 0p e r i o d si f 8 = E . The weighted ex-post-incidence is
equal to 5.0% if 1 = E and falls to 4.8% for 4 = E and finally to 4.71% if 8 = E .
2. As the simulations confirm, firms hoard above all those workers whose qualifying period
is not yet completed and choose a qualifying path with reservation productivities which are
strictly lower than the reservation productivity of the jobs being entitled to the UI benefit, so
that α ≥ > > > + E E R R R K 2 1 , see Fig. (a) and (b).
3. The rule of the qualifying period, moreover, induces the match partners to choose a
threshold value 1 + E R for the jobs which are entitled to UI benefits cet. par. below the thresh-
old R of the insurance system [] b T, ,s ot h a t 1 + > E R R , see Fig. (g). What are the reasons for
this ordering?
The risk-neutral match partners have rational expectations and anticipate the consequences
of a job destruction. In the insurance system [] b T E , , ,γ , the destruction of a job which quali-
fies for UI benefits occurs with the endogenous probability () 1 + E R G λ while in the system24
[] b T, , the probability is () R G λ , where, as the simulations confirm, () ( ) 1 + > E R G R G λ λ .I n
fact, the workers in both insurance systems are entitled to the UI benefit b and an equally long
benefit duration of T periods. Furthermore, in both insurance systems, they have a positive
probability of losing their benefit entitlement and to become long term unemployed. Yet with
the unemployment insurance [] b T, , they can be sure of having the benefit entitlement returned
with their next job. The waiting time, which elapses until a worker who loses his current job
receives the next benefit entitlement, is identical with the duration of job search. In the insur-
ance system [] b T E , , ,γ , on the other hand, a positive probability exists that the worker with an
increasing duration of unemployment will not only lose his benefit entitlement, but also his
qualifying points, so that, on average, cet. par. more time will pass until the completion of the
next qualifying period than just the time of the job search.
While the waiting time which elapses between two benefit entitlements in the system [] b T,
is exogenous for the individual match partner and identical with the expected duration of job
search, () θ p 1 , from the perspective of the job seeker, the waiting time in the insurance sys-
tem [] b T E , , ,γ is endogenous and bounded from below by the expected duration of an unem-
ployment spell, () θ p 1 . The agents choose the optimal waiting time subject to the trade-off
between the waiting time on the one hand and the bargained wage on the other, as discussed
above. As a consequence, in the insurance system [] b T E , , ,γ the reservation income of a
worker entitled to UI benefits is, cet. par., lower than in the unemployment insurance [] b T, ,
his wage income is also lower and his willingness to continue the match despite negative pro-
ductivity shocks is higher.
4. Although the workers entitled to UI benefits in the insurance system [] b T E , , ,γ ,c o m -
pared to the insurance [] b T, , trade a lower wage income for a shorter waiting time and a lower
incidence, so that, in comparison of the two systems 1 + > E R R , within the class of unem-
ployment insurances [] b T E , , ,γ with qualifying period 2 ≥ E this ordering is not valid, as Fig.
(g), Appendix II, illustrates. Since an extension of the qualifying period E lowers both the
duration of the job search and the weighted ex-post-incidence, workers entitled to UI benefits,
for example in the unemployment insurance with 8 = E , prefer a higher reservation productiv-
ity 1 + E R and consequently, a greater incidence () 1 + E R G λ , compared with the case 4 = E .
Note, however, that the weighted ex-post-incidence in the unemployment insurance with
qualifying period 8 = E , is, nevertheless, lower than in the unemployment insurance with
4 = E , see Fig. (d).25
Result 4. As Appendix III shows for a given benefit duration of 10 = T , the equilibrium rate
of unemployment increases with the base period γ , see Fig. (c). For comparison, the four fig-
ures, Appendix III, show the corresponding sequence of the unemployment rate for the unem-
ployment insurance [] b T, ,w h i c himplicitly assumes the parameter values 1 = = γ E .
An increase in γ does not only lower the waiting time, but also the qualifying rents and
therefore the option value of a filled job, moreover, the expected wage income increases, the
supply of vacancies falls and as a result, both the duration of unemployment, see Fig. (b), and
the weighted ex-post-incidence, see Fig. (a), increase. In addition, the figures illustrate that the
equilibrium values of the endogenous variables under the insurance systems [] b T E , , ,γ ,
2 ≥ E , converge with rising γ to the corresponding values of the insurance system [] b T, ,s e e
Fig. (a) – (d).
5. Conclusion
Base period and qualifying period are instruments of the passive labour market policy,
which have so far received little attention in labour market theory, macroeconomic theory and
empirical research. We develop a Mortensen-Pissarides type search model, in which we inte-
grate the following instruments of labour market policy: the base period, the qualifying pe-
riod, the benefit duration and the wage-replacement benefit. A worker is entitled to UI benefit
if during the base period he has completed the qualifying period.
The qualifying period lowers both the incidence and the duration of unemployment and
therefore reduces the aggregate unemployment rate. An increasing base period on the other
hand weakens the effect of the qualifying period by providing workers with a time margin to
meet the criterion of the qualifying rule. The longer the base period, the higher therefore the
equilibrium rate of unemployment.
In an unemployment insurance without qualifying rule – as for example in the standard
Mortensen-Pissarides model – the time that passes until the benefit entitlement occurs is ex-
ogenous. Every worker who makes a transition to unemployment is entitled to UI benefits and
every job seeker must wait until he finds a new job and in turn the next benefit entitlement.
The rule of the qualifying period endogenizes the waiting time and confronts the workers with
the following trade-off. The lower the separation rates negotiated by the match partners, the
longer the durability of the job, the shorter the waiting time, but also the lower the worker’s
wage income. The decision to reduce the waiting time is more attractive the higher the UI
benefits are, the longer the benefit duration and the lower the utility of leisure. The price for a
prolongation of the durability of the job and a shorter waiting time is the wage penalty, which
the worker must accept if the match is hit by negative productivity or demand shocks.26
For a match on the qualifying path, the optimal separation rate falls from period to period,
until it reaches a minimum in the last period before the completion of the qualifying period.
At this moment, the qualifying rents generated by the unemployment insurance are skimmed
off and the reservation productivity, and with it, the separation rate and the wage income of
the workers, who are now entitled to UI benefits, increase sharply. Nevertheless, all employed
workers face separation rates which are lower than under the conditions of an unemployment
insurance with an exogenous waiting time. On the one hand, there are the workers with a
completed qualifying period who bargain for a reduced separation rate because they want to
delay unemployment and the inconveniences the qualifying period brings, on the other hand,
there are those workers – whose qualifying period is not yet completed -, who want to achieve
the benefit entitlement more quickly.
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Appendix I
Tab. A1: The baseline parameter of the model
β  r λ  yz b k αφ  
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Ad: 2. Benefit Duration T
Proof of Lemma 1. (i): From (14), it follows that () () ( ) ( ) x x W UT Π β β β − − = − 1 1. I n s e r t
the asset equations (6) and (7) into the above expression and rearrange terms to get the inside
wage (16).
(ii) From (15), it follows that () () j T j T j T W U − − − − − = − Π β β β 1 1 .P l u g g i n g( 8 )a n d( 9 )i n t o
the last equation gives ( ) ( ) () () [] () [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 w w W U j T j T − + − − = − − − ρ Π β β β , from which in view
of (14) the outside wage (17) follows.
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) and (ii): From (5) and (6) we have () () () ∫ + − =
1 0 R h dG h R w yR Π λ .
From this equation, taking (16) and (6) into account we obtain the equations (18) and (19).
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) From (13), (15), (8) and the wage equation (17), it follows that
(A1) () [ ] 1 + − − + + + = j T j T U b z d D U .





















. Solving the differ-
ence equation (A1) gives:
(A2) = − j T U () [] 0 1
1





































Using (A3) in (A2) gives:
(A4) ()

























From (A4) we get the asset equation (20).
Ad: 3.3 Qualifying Path and Rate of Unemployment in the Steady State
The effects of the parameters of the labour market policy [] b T E , , ,γ on the equilibrium un-
employment rate u do not depend on whether the qualifying period is shorter or longer than
the benefit duration. For the sake of brevity, we represent the pool equations and the proofs
for the case T E ≤ , which most of the OECD (2002) countries follow. The simulations and re-
sults in section 4, however, also take into account the case 1 + ≥ T E .
First we deal with the steady equations for the number of employed workers, i E e − ,
1 , , 0 − = E i K , then we develop the steady state conditions for the job seeker, j iT E u − − ,
E i , , 0 K = , T i j , ,K = , and finally we present four lemmas A1 – A4, to be used to develop
the functions of the fractions () 1 , , + − E E i E R Ψ θ ε .
1. Employed Workers
In the steady state, the following relation hold for the number of the employed workers with
the qualifying counter i E − :30
(A5)
() [] () ( ) []
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Ad 0 = i : E e is the measure of the employed worker with a completed qualifying period.
The inflow of E e consists first of workers with a productive job who are entitled to UI bene-
fits, () [] E E e R G 1 1 + − λ ; second, workers entitled to UI benefits who made a job-to-job transi-
tion, () E E e R G p 1 + λ ; third in the inflow are the workers of the pool 1 − E e who make a transition
to E e , () [] 1 1 − − E E e R G λ , or who made a job-to-job transition, ()1 − E E e R G pλ ; and fourth, the





m E u p ,w h e r e ∑
=
− − − ≡
T
m j
j mT E m E u u , with a qualifying counter
equal to E or 1 − E belong to the inflow of E e .
Ad 1 − = E i : The inflow of the pool 1 e consists of successful job seekers whose qualifying










2.1 For the measure of job seekers with a completed qualifying period and a current spell
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Ad 0 = j : ET u is the pool of the unemployed with a completed qualifying period and full
entitlement to UI benefits. As the first line of (A6) shows, the inflow to ET u consists of
workers with a completed qualifying period who lost their job in the previous period and did
not meet a vacancy during the last matching.
Ad T j = : The third line of (A6) shows the inflow to the pool of job seekers with a com-
pleted qualifying period, but no residual claims to unemployment insurance, 0 E u . The inflow
consists of job seekers from the pool 1 0 E E u u + who, although without a match, retain their
qualifying points: a composite event, which has the probability () p − 1 γ .
2.2 For the pool of job seekers with a current spell of unemployment of length j and a
qualifying counter equal to i E − , j iT E u − − , the steady state condition holds31
(A7)
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Ad i j E i = = , , , 1K : Since i j ≥ , i iT E u − − is the pool of job seekers which has the shortest
current spell of unemployment of i j = periods given the qualifying counter i E − . As the first
line of (A7) illustrates, the inflow to i iT E u − − consists of unsuccessful job seekers who still
belonged to the pool ()( ) 1 1 − − − − j T i E u in the previous period.9
Ad T j E i = − = , 1 , , 1K : The inflow to the pool 0 i E u − is first composed of workers who
lost their job because of a negative shock and did not meet a vacancy during the subsequent
matching, () () i E i E e R G p − − − − ) ( 1 1 λ . Secondly, the fraction of the unsuccessful job seekers from
pool 1 0 i E i E u u − − + makes a transition to 0 i E u − , who retain their qualifying points.10 Finally
the fraction of unsuccessful job seekers from the pool () () 1 1 0 1 − − − − + i E i E u u , who lose a quali-
fying point belong also to the inflow to 0 i E u − .11
2.3 For job seekers with a current spell of unemployment of length E j ≥ , whose qualifying
counter is equal to zero, j T u − 0 , the following steady state condition hold
(A8)
() ()()
() () ()() []
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= − − − −
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Ad T j = : The pool 00 u consists of job seekers who have neither qualifying points or re-
sidual claims for unemployment insurance. The inflow to 00 u is composed of unsuccessful
job seekers first from pool 01 00 u u + and second from pool 11 10 u u + who lose the last qualify-
ing point at the transition.
3. Lemmas
Lemma A1. (i) Let 1 1≥ + ≥ i T , then the following equation holds:
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9 In view of base period F, this transition corresponds to the transition of a job seeker with the qualifying
counter () 1 − − i E who did not meet a vacancy and was employed F periods ago.
10 These workers were unemployed F periods ago at the beginning of the previous base period.
11 These workers were employed F periods ago at the beginning of the previous base period.32
The following lemma presents solutions of the difference equations (A6) – (A8) for the dif-
ferent types of job seekers. To solve the equations, we use the conditional probability
() () ( ) []










1 1 , which depends on the tightness θ . A job seeker makes a transition
from his type-specific pool ∑ = − − − ≡ T
i j j iT E i E u u either because his search was successful or
because he did not meet a vacancy and loses a qualifying point. The first event occurs with
the probability p, the second with the probability () () p − − 1 1 γ . a is the probability that a job
seeker who makes a transition will not find a job and loses a qualifying point. a − 1 is the
probability that a job seeker who makes a transition will find a new job.
Lemma A2. (i) [JOB SEEKERS] 1. For the job seeker pool j iT E u − − , with 1 , , 0 − = E i K
and 1 , , − = T i j K , the following is true:
(A11) () () ( ) E E
i j j i




1 1 1 +
− +






= λ γ γ .
2. For the job seeker pool 0 i E u − , with 1 , , 1 − = E i K , we have:
(A12) () ()() () 
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k i e R G a
1
1 λ .
3. For the pool 0 E u we can prove:
(A13) () () () E E
T T
E e R G p
p
p









4. For the pool () j E T u + − 0 , with () 1 , 0 + − = E T j K , the following is the case:
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5. For the pool 00 u the following is true:
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(ii) [AGGREGATED POOLS] 1. In the steady state, the aggregated pool ∑
=
− − − ≡
T
i j
j iT E i E u u,
1 , , 1 − = E i K , has the mass
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the following is true
(A17) () () E E E e R G
p
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0 0 the following steady state equation holds:
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The next lemma develops the solutions of the difference equations (A5).
LEMMA A3. [EMPLOYED WORKER]( i )For the measure of workers with the qualifying
counter i E − , the following is true:
(A19)
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(ii) By using the difference equations (A19) we obtain:
(A20) () E E E i E i E i E e R R R f e 1 , , , , + − − − = K θ , 1 , 1 − = E i K
where for the frequencies i E f − , 2 , , 1 − = E i K , the following holds:
(A21) () () () () () ( )
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and for 1 f:
(A22) ()
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where () E E R R , , 2 K = Ψ . Also, let 1 ≡ E f .
LEMMA A4. [FRACTIONS i E− ε ] With Lemma A3 we obtain the fraction of employed work-
ers with the qualifying counter i E − to:34
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Ψ θ ε , 1 , , 0 − = E i K .
4. Proofs of the Lemmas A1 – A4
Proof of Lemma A1. (i) 1. Let 0 = i , then clearly () () [] () 1 1 1 1 1
1
0





j j T T p p p γ γ γ
holds.
2. Assume the statement is true for i, then for 1 + i and 2 + ≥ i T with
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T RHS γ γ γ γ
it follows that
() ( ) [] () () () 
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The second summand in the above equation is equal to zero! We prove this statement by
induction over the benefit duration 2 + ≥ i T . Clearly, for 2 + = i T , () 1 2 = + i RHS holds. For
the conclusion from T to 1 + T , in view of the induction hypothesis, it then holds that:
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1 = .
(ii) 1. If 1 + = E T , then () () 1 = = T LHS T RHS is true. 2. For the conclusion from T to 1 + T
we develop the RHS of the equation (A10):
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() 1 + = T LHS .
Proof of Lemma A2. (i) [JOB SEEKERS] 1. When i j = ,i nv i e wo f( A 7 )t h es t a t e m e n tf o l -
lows directly from the equation () () ()() 1 1 1 1 − − − − − − − − = i T i E i iT E u p u γ .N o w ,l e t i j > ,t h e nb y
virtue of (A7), the following results by induction over j:
() () () ()( ) [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 − − − − − − − − − − + − = j T i E j iT E j iT E u u p u γ γ
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2. With (A7),
() () ( ) () ( ) () () ( ) [ ] 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 − − − − − − − − − − + − + + + − = i E i E i E i E i E i E i E u u u u e R G p u γ γ λ
()
() () () ()() () () [] 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
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We eliminate the pools 1 i E u − and () 1 1 − − i E u using (A11), and replace pool () 0 1 − − i E u by in-













γ , to arrive at:
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Collecting terms it follows:
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.
3. With (A6) () ( ) 1 0 0 1 E E E u u p u + − =γ results. If we eliminate 1 E u with (A11) and solve
for 0 E u , the statement follows.36
4. From (A8) () () () ()() [ ] 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 − + − − + − + − − + − = j E T j E T j E T u u p u γ . If we eliminate
() 1 1 − + − j E T u with (A11) and () 1 0 − + − j E T u by induction over j, the statement follows:
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−
= γ . Replace 01 u with (A14), 10 u with (A12)
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, we can write:
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(ii) [AGGREGATED POOLS] The equations for the aggregated pools (A16) – (A18) can be
derived from the macroeconomic steady state conditions or, as below, from the microeco-
nomic pool equations (A11) – (A15).
1. For the pool ∑
=
− − − ≡
T
i j
j iT E i E u u ,i nv i e wo f ∑
−
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j iT E i E i E u u u , the following re-
sults from (A11) and (A12):
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so that, in view of Lemma A1 (i), the statement follows.
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from (A11), 0 = i and (A13) follows.
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If we replace 00 u using (A15), the proposition follows.
Proof of Lemma A3. (i) 1. For E e , we get with 0 = i from (A5):
() [] () ( ) []() [] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 − − − + + + + + − + + − = E E E E E E E E E E E u u p e R G p e R G e R G p e R G e λ λ λ λ .
If we replace 1 − + E E u u using (A16) and (A17) and solve for 1 − E e , we obtain the first line
of (A19).
2. For 2 , , 1 − = E i K , we obtain the following from (A5), in view of (A16):
() [] () () () () 1 1 1 1 + − + − − + − − − + + − = i E i E i E i E i E i E pu e R G p e R G e λ λ
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0
1 1 1 1 1 1 λ λ
() () [] () i E i E i E apu e R G p a − + − − + − − = 1 1 1 λ
() () [] () () () () ( ) [ ] [ ] i E i E i E i E i E e R G p e a e R G p a − − − − − + − − − − − + − − = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 λ λ .
To derive the last equation we make use of (A5). Rearranging terms gives:
() ( ) () () ( ) [ ] () () [] () 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 + − − − − − − − − − − = − − + − i E i E i E i E i E i E e R G p a e R G p a e e a λ λ .
By induction over i,w eg e t : () () ( ) [ ] () 1 1 1 1 − − − − − = − − i E i E i E ae e R G p a λ . Replacing the LHS
and solving for () 1 + − i E e gives the second line of (A19).
3. For 1 e and 1 − = E i , 0 1 pu e = results from (A5), with (A18) we get:
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k E e R G a p e λ . From the last equation, it follows that
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k E e R G a p e R G p a e λ λ . If we solve for 1 e ,w eg e tt h el a s t
line of (A19).
(ii) The expression (A20) is derived from (A19) by virtue view of (A21) and (A22).38
Proof of Lemma A4. In view of (A20) we can write E i E i E f ε ε − − = . From this, we can con-
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Inserting this expression into E i E i E f ε ε − − = gives the statement (A23).
The conditional probabilities j iT E − − µ - that an applicant has i E − qualifying points and a
residual claim to the UI benefit b of j T − periods – directly follow from Lemma A2 (i) and
Lemma A4.
Lemma A5. For the conditional probabilities u u j iT E j iT E − − − − = µ , we obtain, with
() ( ) () () () () () 1
1
0
1 1 1 , , , , 1 , , − −
−
=
+ − − − + ∑ − ≡ i E
E
i
E E i E i E E E R G R R R f p R F λ θ θ Ψ θ K ,
the following:
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where () 1 , , + ≡ E E R F F Ψ θ .
Ad: 3.4 Qualifying Rents and Waiting Period
The distribution rule, which is used for wage negotiations between a vacancy and a job
seeker, is as follows:





, E i , , 0 K = , T i j , ,K = ,39
where j iT E W − − is the value of an employed outsider with i E − qualifying points and a
benefit duration of j T − periods, j iT E U − − is the value of the unemployed outsider, and
j iT E − − Π is the initial value of the filled job.
j iT E − − Π depends on the job seeker’s residual claims and the current status of the qualify-
ing counter, where the following is true, in view of the initial productivity 1 = x , the outside
wage j iT E w − − and the asset equations (23) and (25):
(A30)
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For the distribution of the initial values of the job seeker, j iT E W − − , analogously we have:
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In (A32) z is the utility of leisure, b the UI benefit and [ ) 1 , 0 ∈ γ t h eb a s ep e r i o d .I ft h ej o b
seeker does not meet a vacancy, his current spell of unemployment increases from length j to
1 + j , while the counter of the qualifying period is constant with probability 1 < γ and de-
creases from i E − to () 1 + − i E by one point with probability 0 1 > − γ .12
In view of the asset pricing equations (23) – (26) and the sharing rules (14) and (27), we
obtain
12 The job seeker – like B in the introductory example – was unemployed F periods ago and in the second case –
like A - he was employed at the beginning of the base period.40
LEMMAA6 [BARGAINEDINSIDE WAGE]. Considering the reservation income ET rU of an
insider with a completed qualifying period and the qualifying rents () 0 1 0 + − − − i E i E U U ,
1 , , 2 − = E i K , the agents negotiate the following inside wages.
The bargained inside wage of a worker with a completed qualifying period at a match spe-
cific productivity x is
(A33) () ( ) ET ET E rU yx rU x w − + = + β 1 .
Insiders who make a transition from () 1 + − i E e to i E e − earn the bargained inside wage
(A34) ()
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( ) () ( ) () ( )
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Proof of Lemma A6. 1. From the distribution rule (14), it follows that:
()( ) ( ) () ET E E U x x W β Π β β − = − − + + 1 1 1 1 . Using the asset equations (23) – (24) and rearrang-
ing terms provides the wage equation (A33).
2. From the distribution rule (27), it follows that:
()( ) ( ) () () 0 1 1 1 + − − − − = − − i E i E i E U x x W β Π β β , 1 , , 0 − = E i K .I fw eu s e-f o r 1 , , 0 − = E i K -
the asset equation (25) and assume 0 = i , then by virtue of the first line of (26) and the wage
equation (A33), we obtain the first line of the wage equation (A34). The other wage equations
of (A34) result analogously.
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Wage equation (29) corresponds to the wage equation (A33) of
Lemma A6. We obtain the wage equation (30) in the following way. For 0 = i , we get from
(A34):
() () ( ) ( ) 1
10 1 1 −
− + − − − = ρ β E ET E E U U x w x w .
If we replace () x wE 1 + using (A33) and rearrange, we get the first line of (30). Now assume
that the statement is true for () () x w i E 1 − − .F o r () x w i E− , we obtain with (A34):
() () () ( ) () () ()() () i E i E i E i E i E i E U U U U x w x w − − −
−
+ − − − − − − − + − − − = 0 1
1
0 1 0 1 1 1 β ρ β .
If we replace () () x w i E 1 − − using (30) and rearrange, we obtain the proposition.
(ii) From the distribution rule (A29), we can write:
() () j iT E j iT E j iT E U W − − − − − − − = − − β Π β β 1 1 . Inserting the asset equations (A30) and (A31),
we obtain the wage equations (31).
Proof of the Proposition. (i) If we solve the asset equation (23) for () x E 1 + Π and take the
wage equation (A33) into account, we obtain:







E R E ET E h dG h rU yx
r
x Π λ β β
λ
Π .
Let 1 + = E R x in (A35) the by virtue of () 0 1 1 = + + E E R Π , we obtain the asset equation (33).41
If we use the wage equation (30) in (25), we obtain, for 1 , , 2 − = E i K :
(A36) ( )()() () () () [ ] { + − − + − − − = + − − + − − 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 i E i E i E i E U U rU yx x β β β ρ Π
() () () ( ) () () {}
() } ∫ − − − − − − − +
1
1 1
1 , 0 max 1
i E R i E i E x h dG h Π λ Π λ .
If we use i E R x − = in (A36) and consider the reservation condition (32), we obtain the con-
tinuation value (34).
(ii) If we use 1 + = E R x in (A35) and solve the equation for 1 + E R , considering (32), we get
the job-destruction rule (35). Correspondingly, if we use i E R x − = in (A36) and solve for the
reservation productivity i E R − , we get the job-destruction-rule (36).
LEMMA A7. (i) [RESERVATION INCOME] 1. The reservation income of a job seeker who
neither owns qualifying points nor claims for unemployment benefits is:











2. The value of a job seeker who does not have qualifying points, but still has claims to UI
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3. For the reservation income of an insider with a qualifying counter equal to i E − ,
1 , , 1 − = E i K , the following is true












































4. The value of a job seeker with a current spell of unemployment of length 1 , , − = T i j K
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6. A job seeker with a completed qualifying period and residual claims to UI benefit over









ET j ET d b U U
1
.
(ii) [RENTS] 1. From (A39) we get the qualifying rent for a match that makes a transition
from () 1 + − i E e to i E e − with:
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2. Lemma 4, equation (31), shows that for two workers with a completed qualifying period
– one is an outsider, the other an insider -, the outsider has the worse bargaining position.
The wage penalty he must accept is given by (A42) and the capital gain of an additional bene-









j ET ET d b U U
1
.
3. If we compare two workers with i E − qualifying points – one is an outsider with a re-
sidual benefit duration of j T − periods, the other is an insider -, then the outsider is better








i E j iT E d b U U
1
0 .
Proof of Lemma A7. (i) 1. The statement follows with E i = , T j = from the asset equations
(A30), (A32) and the distribution rule (A29).
2. Assume E i = and 1 , , − = T E j K then from the asset equations (A30), (A32) and the dis-
tribution rule (A29) we get:
() () [] () () () [] 1 0 00 1 0 1 1
1
1 1 1
















Replace ) 1 ( 1 Π using (A37), and solve the difference equation to derive the statement.
3. From the asset equation (A32), the distribution rule (27) and the equation (A30) for the
initial value of a filled job, we get


















Replace 00 U with equation (A37), solve the difference equation and the statement follows.
4. With the asset equation (A32), the distribution rule (A29) and the initial value of a filled
job (A30) we obtain the following difference equation in the benefit duration j T − :
(A46) ()() [] () () ( ) []
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First, we show that the proposition holds for 1 = − j T .F o r 1 = − j T , we can derive from
(A46) that43
()() [] () () ( ) []






− − − −
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If we substitute the expression in the last brackets with (A39) by z rU i E − − 0 and rearrange,
we obtain the statement: db U U i E i E + = − − 0 1 . For the conclusion from j T − to () 1 − − j T we













i E j iT E d b U U .
5. With (A32), (A30) and the distribution rule (14), we obtain the following equation for
the guarantee value of an insider with a completed qualifying period, ET U :
(A47) () () () ( ) [] 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
− − − + − + + + +
− −
= T E ET E ET U U b z
p
p




To solve the difference equation, we need to know the guarantee value of a job seeker with
a completed qualifying period and an unemployment spell of one period, 1 − ET U . The value
1 1 − − T E U results from (A40).
With (A32), (A30), the distribution rule (A29) and the wage equation (31) we get:
(A48) ()() [] () ( ) [] + − +
− − −









() () () [ ] 1 1 1 1 + − − + − − + + + j T E j ET U U b z d γ γ .
Solve the difference equation (A48) to obtain:
(A49) ()() []
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For 0 E U , we get from (A32), (A30), the distribution rule (A29) and the wage equation
(31):
(A50) () () ( ) [] () ( ) [] + − +
+ − − −























Insert (A50) and (A47) in (A49), to obtain the following equation for 1 = j :44
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Inserting (A51) into (A47) the statement follows by virtue of (A39) and (A40).
6. From (A47) and (A48) we can deduce that
(A52) () [ ] () () [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 + − − − − + − − − − − + − = − j T E T E j ET ET j ET ET U U d U U d U U γ γ .
Solving this difference equation we arrive at:
(A53) () [] () ( ) () [] ∑
=
+ − − − −
−
− − − − + − = −
m
k








0 1 γ γ γ ,
where j T m − = .
For 0 E m ET U U − − we obtain from (A48), (A50) and (A45):
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E m ET E m ET d db U U d U U γ γ .
The solution of this difference equation gives (A54). From (A42), (A47) and (A50) we get:
db U U E E = − 0 1 . Inserting this expression into (A54), considering j T m − = ,w eg e t :
() () d d bd U U j
E m ET − − = − − 1 1 0 . Using this equation in (A53) gives the statement by virtue
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